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IN THE SUP·REME COURT
OF T'HE STATE OF UTAH
ELIZABETH JENSEN,
IJlal~ntiff and Respondent,
-vs.HEBER JOHN ''THITESID,ES and
EFFIE WHITESIDES, husband and

Case
No. 9581

\\~ife,

Defendants a·nd Appellants.

STATE~1ENT

OF THE KIND OF CASE

Respondent sued appellant in the District Court for
Salt Lake County claiming unjust enrichment, and p·raying for restitution of $3,000.00 plus the amount of certain
small bills paid by plaintiff, less the reasonable rental
value of certain premises for the time they were occupied
by plaintiff, together ,v·ith interest and court costs.

A jury found in plaintiff's favor, a'varded a verdict
of $1,000.00, and judgment thereon "Tas entered.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek reversal or a ne'v trial.

S'TATEMENT OF FACT·S
Defendants' statement of facts is argumentative,
largely irrelevant, and stated most favorably for defendants. For a view of the facts stated favorably in support of the verdict (Jolvnson Readi-Mix Concrete Company v. United Pacific Insurance Company, (Utah 1961)
358 P.2d 337; Hogan Dairy Company v. Creamery Package Manufacturing Company, (Utah 1961) 358 P.2d 906)
plaintiff submits the following:
In September 1957, at Port Angeles in the State of
Washington, plaintiff and defendants agreed verbally
that defendants would build a small frame home for
plaintiff and her husband near Layton, Utah (T. 4).
Plaintiff and her husband ''Tere to have possession and
own the ·house, and were to pay defendants the sum of
$3,000.00 for it (T. 17, 42, 43).
Plaintiff paid the $3,000.00 to defendants and defendants proceeded to construct a log cabin type home on land
which they either owned or controlled near Layton, l""tah.
The home cost approximately $9,000.00 to build. Plaintiff
moved into the house in January, 1958, and moved out
in t·he forep·art of December, 1959. Between those dates,
the friendly relationship 'vhich had theretofore existed
bet,veen the purties deteriorated. At one time in the
22 month period referred to above, plaintiff asked defendant Jack Whitesides for some evidence of her ownership
2
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of the home or at least an equity in it, and he refused to
deliver it. After defendants' refusal eithe.r to convey an
equity in the home to plaintiff or to repay to her the
$3,000.00, less reasonable rental value, plaintiff commenced this action.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JURY VERDICT.

The general rule, heretofore announced by this court
and uniformly supported by all the authorities, is that
the verdict of a jury will be sustained on ap·peal if there
is any e.vidence in the record supporting it, either directly
and immediately or by fair inference. Porter v. Price,
11 Utah 2d 80, 355 P.2d 66 (1960); Cottrell v. Grand
Union Tea Company, 5 Utah 2d 187, 299 P.2d 622, 626
(1956); 3 Am. Jur., Appeal and Er-ror, §952 (1936).
Defendants have, in their brief, cited sufficient evidence to support the verdict. Because of its pertinenee,
material portions are here set forth again (T. 42-43) :
''THE COURT: Mr. Summerhays, I am at
a loss to kno":r just 'vhat the understanding was.
What does she claim~ If you will ask her some
questions along that line about this understanding.
Q. I "\Yill do that, your Honor. Of course I
have been looking at my own case to find out 'vhat
it wasn't. I will ask her what it was. vVhat was
your understanding, l\Irs. Jensen, with respect
to what was to happen to the property and this
$3,000.00 that was advanced~
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A.

. 0!
Well, \Yhat was my understand mg ·

Q.

Yes~

THE COURT : Not her understanding.
Q.

W·ell what -

THE ·COURT:
Q.

The understanding.

What was the understanding:!

A. Well my understanding, or the understanding was that he \vas going to build us a little
house, a small house for $3,000.00 and give us
the house. \V e \Yere to have possession and o\vn
the house. Now that \vas the idea."
Defendant Jack \rhitesides testified to the same agreement (T. -±) :

'Q.

Now \Yhat \vas the purpose of this
$3,000.00 payment ?
A. The purpose of the $3,000.00 was due to
the fact that she \vas getting aged. She and her
husband, they wanted a ho1ne to "~here \Ye could
help take care of then1. They wanted us to build
them a little home do\vn in the hollo\v, \Yhat \Ye
call it, or the big ravine \vhere \Ye haYe a little
home that we live in in the su1nn1er, and she saysyou could build either out here by the silo or down
here in the bushes by the creek. And so \ve talked
about it many tin1es.
4

Q.

Did you eventually build that home for

A.

Yes. We did build a ho1ne-' ~

her~

The defendants clai1ned, and tried to prove, that ~Irs.
Jensen didn't expect to receiYe any O\vnership of a
home for her $3,000.00, but the jury found against them
and the verdict again is amply supported by the evidence.
4
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For exa1nple, the follo,ving testimony of the plaintiff
(T. 24):
~'Q.

vV as the house

insured~

A. Yes. The house \vas insured and I found
that out accidently.
Q.

any

Were you ever named as an assured on

policy~

A. No. There was nothing to show that I had
any equity in the house at all. And I found this
insurance policy on the table, looked at it, and the
next time I saw Mr. Whitesides I said - Jack,
I said, you insured the house. And ·he said - yes.
And I said - well, I said, there is nothing to show
that I have any equity in it and I said usually an
insurance policy is written in the name of the two
people who have an equity in it. And I said in the
second person it is as their interest may appear.
Oh, he says, I'll insure it under a blanket policy.
He said its not going to burn down. Well he had
a fire before that, before I ever moved into it-"
And further at T. 40:

"'Q. vVas it your intention that you pay the
taxes~

A. I had never thought of taxes because for
the simple reason that I had absolutely nothing
to show-1\fr. Whitesides never gave me one thing
in writing to show that I had any equity in that
house.''
And the following testimony from the d·efendant Jack
Whitesides (T. 100):
'' Q. Now you knew l\Irs. Jensen expected to
get
forforher
$3000.00
~ of Museum and Library Services
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A.

Oh, yes.

Q.

And you lmew that at the time~

A. Yes.''
Defendants devote considerable argument to the
proposition that they never expressly promised plaintiff
a deed to any property. They concede, at page 14 of their
brief, that the inference that a deed would be given might
necessarily arise from the "surrounding circumstances
of the parties," but contend that such circumstances
did not exist here. Defendants then cite a number of
facets of the parties' relationship which all tend to show
that this is the sort of thing they would not have eX!pressed, but which was, instead, implicit in their dealings.
For example, they made frequent visits over long distances with ·each other; they exchanged gifts; they stayed
at each other's homes; they were blood relatives; plaintiff
placed large sums of money in defendants' hands for
certain purposes; defendants drove plaintiff and her
invalid husband to Layton from Port Angeles, Washington; plaintiff gave defendant Effie ,~Vhitesides access to
her safe deposit box; plaintiff made it clear that defendant Effie Whitesides should have plaintiff's property
when she passed away; and finally, the parties didn't
bother to p·ut in writing their understandings and agreements, including their agree1nent as to the transaction
in question.
Rather, then, than to exp·ect to find an express
agreement to give a deed, one would expect that the parties simply understood this. It "~as implied' bet,veen them.
6
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It is the only reasonable inference in view of their relationship as above set forth.
POINT II
DEFENDAN'TS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 4 WAS
PROPERLY REFUSED.

Defendants' requested instruction No.4 is apparently
based on Section 69 of the Restate1nent of the Law of
Restitution, but it misquotes the section and distorts the
n1eaning. That section is found in the portion of the restatement which deals with mistake and by its sp·ecific
provisions, it refers to those situations where mutual mistake is an element. The subparagraphs of the section
show it to be totally inapplicable here, and it was prop:erly
refused.
CONCLUSION
There were numerous conflicts in the evidence presented to the jury in this case and it was the prerogative of the jurors to believe which of the witnesess they
chose. Their verdict in favor of the plaintiff is amply
supported in the evidence and the judgment of the trial
court based thereon should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

K. ROGER BEAN
50 North Main Street
Layton, Utah
Attorney for Respondent.
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